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THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM ARGUMENT 
Loren Meierding 
In antiquity the consensus gentium argument for God's existence was believed to 
have merit (cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Book II, sect.2,4), but has been consid-
ered blatantly fallacious during more recent times. In this article Bayes' 
Theorem is applied to show that the argument is in fact a valid inductive argu-
ment. A two hypothesis and a four hypothesis version of the argument are ana-
lyzed. Perusal of available statistical evidence suggests that when better world-
wide opinion polling data becomes available it will turn out to be sound as well. 
In antiquity the consensus gentium argument for God's existence was 
taken seriously. As its name indicates, it is the argument that the 
common consent, agreement, or belief among human beings that God 
exists justifies believing that God does truly exist. The argument 
dates back to the Stoics. It is the argument which Cicero invokes in 
his De Natura Deorum (Book II, sect. 2, 4). Cicero implies that it is the 
fact that men believe in the gods that warrants believing that they 
exist. Indeed, he claims that human belief in them grows stronger 
with the passage of time. Consequently, there is little need to discuss 
the question of their existence. The main question of interest is what 
nature they have. Cicero repeats the reasons Cleanthes the Stoic 
gives on why people believe in the divine. The reasons cited are 
augurial predictions of future events, the blessings people enjoy, the 
display of force in nature, and beauty and design of nature (Book II, 
sect. 5). The argument from design is really the chief basis for peo-
ple's belief in the divine according to Cicero, but the general belief 
people have in divine beings is the fact that settles the question of 
their existence. 
Although the consensus gentium argument was considered important 
by ancient writers, in modern times the argument is not taken seriously. 
Indeed, the argument seems so blatantly fallacious that when Paul 
Edwards wrote his article on the consensus gentium argument for the 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he did not find any philosophers among the 
exponents of the argument.! However, despite the poor reception the 
argument has received during the modern period, when it is examined 
as an inductive argument, I believe that it is not fallacious, is not devoid 
of value, and does offer support for theism. 
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Appropriateness of Applying a Bayesian Approach 
The consensus gentium argument argues for the truth of the hypothesis 
that God exists based on the evidence of the common belief of men and 
women that he exists. Although Cicero may have thought that this evi-
dence by itself was sufficient for believing in God's existence, of greater 
interest is whether the argument provides any support for God's exis-
tence. With the exception of the ontological argument, the arguments 
for God's existence are essentially inductive arguments claiming that 
belief in God is justified based on various kinds of available evidence. 
Evaluating the consensus gentium argument depends on determining 
whether a rational person is justified in increasing his or her degree of 
belief in God when the consensus gentium inductive evidence is added to 
the background evidence he or she already has. We ask-should a ratio-
nal person who learns that people, or at least a majority, believe that 
God exists increase his or her degree of belief that God exists, perhaps 
tipping the balance in favor of believing that God exists? The Bayesian 
model for scientific and inductive reasoning provides a powerful con-
ceptual framework for evaluating valid inductive arguments and induc-
tive inferences.2 The Bayesian approach provides a method to evaluate 
the impact of incorporating additional evidence with previously known 
or background evidence to determine whether specific new evidence 
supports or is evidence against a particular belief or hypothesis. It will 
help us judge more objectively the warrant for believing God exists from 
the consensus gentium evidence.' 
The Bayesian model is in accord with the basic facts about our epis-
temic situation. We are limited in knowledge concerning past, present, 
and future events and the existence of various hypothetical entities. Some 
conceived entities are clearly more probable and likely to exist than oth-
ers. Presumably we should generally believe statements and hypotheses 
that have high probability on our evidence and reject those that have low 
probability. If we are rational, we must also be consistent. The axioms of 
probability impose constraints on the probability values we can assign to 
statements and hypotheses without being guilty of inconsistency. The 
Bayesian approach applies these constraints to the analysis of inductive 
inference illuminating the rationality of inductive arguments. 
By applying the highly plausible and powerful Bayesian approach, it 
is possible to develop the consensus gentium argument in a fashion which 
shows the argument does have inductive validity, that is, if evidence of 
the common consent variety is possessed, then that evidence offers sup-
port for God's existence. Actual possession of evidence of common con-
sent would then make the argument sound and strengthen the support 
for belief in God's existence. Although the evidence available tends to 
suggest this inductively valid argument is probably sound, a definitive 
pronouncement on its soundness at this point in time is premature, since 
the evidence about the religious beliefs of the majority of people is so 
sketchy-opinion polls have been taken in the U.S. and Europe, but not 
worldwide. Deeper investigation of the evidence about people's beliefs 
about the divine is needed. Although the argument is inductively valid 
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and apparently offers support for theism, this does not mean that it, by 
itself, as Cicero thought, must provide sufficient justification for belief in 
God's existence. It may, when combined with other evidence, however, 
provide sufficient support for rational belief in God's existence. With 
the addition of the evidence of common consent to other available evi-
dence, the scale may be tipped in the favor of theism. We are concerned 
here only with whether possession of common consent evidence offers 
support for God's existence. 
The Bayesian Approach 
We are interested in deciding what a rational human being should 
conclude when presented with evidence that a majority of people 
believe that God exists. There are various theistic and non-theistic views 
that a person can adopt. When a rational person adds the consensus gen-
tium evidence to the evidence he or she already possesses, it may 
increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the probabilities of the different 
belief options. The analysis requires a distinction be made between the 
evidence offered in an inductive argument to justify accepting or 
strengthening one's belief in an hypothesis, let us call this evidence M, 
and the background evidence which a person whose rationality or war-
rant for making an inductive inference is at issue already possesses. Let 
the background evidence be E. E includes all evidence possessed by a 
person making an inductive inference except M and any evidence entail-
ing M. E is all the evidence that a rational person possesses, but not all 
the evidence available. No one can have access to more than a very 
small fraction of all the experiences of billions of people. 
In order to apply the Bayesian approach, that is, apply Bayes 
Theorem, the hypotheses analyzed must include a set of mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive hypotheses. For each hypothesis in the set there are 
three probabilities which must be distinguished. The first is the prior 
probability of an hypothesis. It is the conditional probability of the 
hypothesis on the background evidence E alone. The second is the likli-
hood of an hypothesis. It also is a conditional probability. Unlike the 
other probabilities which are probabilities of the hypotheses, it is a prob-
ability of obtaining the evidence M we are evaluating. It is the probabili-
ty that one should assign to obtaining evidence M given the background 
evidence and knowledge that the hypothesis is in fact true. The third 
probability is called the posterior probability of an hypothesis. It is the 
conditional probability of the hypothesis on the total evidence a rational 
person possesses, that is, on the background evidence E together with 
the evidence M.4 
Bayes Theorem relates the three probabilities for each hypothesis.s It 
states that the posterior probability of an hypothesis is equal to the product of 
the liklihood of the hypothesis, the prior probability of the hypothesis, and a con-
stant. The constant factor is the same for all hypotheses and ensures 
that, like the prior probabilities, the posterior probabilities will sum to 
one. Bayes Theorem has great value because it reflects a very basic fact 
about inductive inference. When we are trying to decide between two 
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or more possible hypotheses, we may draw some inferences about what 
is likely to be observed for each hypothesis given the background evi-
dence that we have. Some outcomes may have a high probability if one 
hypothesis were true and a low probability if the other were true and 
vice versa. If we then observe one of the possible outcomes, we will jus-
tifiably conclude that the hypothesis which implied a high probability 
for it is more likely to be true than we previously believed and the 
hypothesis which implied a low probability is less likely than before. If 
the prior probabilities and the liklihoods for the hypotheses can be esti-
mated, then Bayes' Theorem can be applied to produce the resulting 
posterior probability that an individual hypothesis is true on the new 
evidence (here the evidence of common consent) taken together with the 
prior information already known. 
Since this approach is fundamental for inductive reasoning in practical 
matters, in science, and in statistics, many examples could be offered. 
Consider an urn that we are told contains 50 black or white balls. We can 
draw 10 balls without replacement. All 10 are black. This outcome has a 
probability of 1 if all the balls are black but is .31 if only 5 are white. The 
probability that no more than 5 are white is .79 and the probability that 
no more than 10 are white is .95. Although it is possible that as many as 
40 are white, we have reason to conclude that all are black or very few 
are white. Determining liklihoods for hypotheses is analogous to devel-
oping consequences of scientific theories and testing them (these conse-
quences are deductive with probability of 1). When Einstein formulated 
the general theory of relativity he derived predictions of the number of 
degrees that light rays from Mercury would bend as they passed by the 
sun in an eclipse and also the number of degrees of arc that the perihe-
lion of Mercury advances per century. The predictions differed marked-
ly from the predictions of non-relativistic mechanics. When measure-
ments were made, they agreed closely with Einstein's predictions. The 
observed evidence greatly increased the probability that the theory of rel-
ativity was true and non-relativistic theories were false. 
The purpose of estimating values for the posterior and prior probabili-
ties is to determine whether the new evidence increases the probability of 
the hypothesis so that the posterior probability of the hypothesis is greater 
than its prior probability. If it does so, then the evidence can be said to 
support or provide confirmation for the hypothesis and the argument 
will be inductively valid." Conversely if the evidence reduces the posteri-
or probability of an hypothesis below its prior probability, then it can be 
said to disconfirm or reduce support for the hypothesis. We are interest-
ed then, in whether the evidence that people believe that God exists, sup-
ports or tends to confirm the hypothesis that God does exist by raising or 
lowering the posterior probability. 1£ it does, the argument is valid. If we 
happen also to know that M the evidence of common consent is available 
or true, then the inductive argument is also a sound argument. 
Fortunately some consequences which follow from Bayes Theorem 
permit conclusions to be drawn by merely focusing on the relative prob-
ability values that should be assigned to the liklihoods. It is not neces-
sary to determine exact values for all the probabilities. If we know which 
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liklihood for a set of hypotheses has the highest value, then we can show that 
obtaining M makes the posterior probability greater than the prior probability 
and provides confirmation for that hypothesis. In fact, it provides the strongest 
confirmation.7 Correspondingly, if we know which liklihood has the 
lowest value, then we can show that obtaining M provides the strongest 
disconfirmation for that hypothesis. The other liklihoods mayor may 
not provide confirmation or disconfirmation. Obviously, if there are 
only two hypotheses and the two liklihoods are unequal, the hypothesis 
with the greater liklihood will provide confirmation and the lesser will 
provide disconfirmation. Thus, if all we know is that the liklihood of 
evidence is higher for one hypothesis than each of the others, this is 
enough to show that the evidence supports or confirms that hypothesis. 
We will show this for the consensus gentium argument thereby showing 
that it is a valid inductive argument. On the other hand, if all we know 
is that the liklihood of evidence is lower for one hypothesis than all the 
others, this is enough to show that it is evidence against or disconfirms 
that hypothesis. With these prefatory remarks in place, let us begin the 
analysis of the consensus gentium argument. 
Specification of Hypotheses for Analysis 
Bayes' Theorem is not applicable unless it is applied to a set of mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. We must therefore distin-
guish such a set of hypotheses concerning Cod's existence. In its sim-
plest form the argument is analyzed with two hypotheses which reveal 
the essential features of the argument. It will be useful to distinguish 
also a more complex version with four hypotheses to bring out impor-
tant additional features. 
We are interested in knowing whether the consensus gentium argument 
supports theism. There are various ways to define theism. We will take 
the most fundamental attributes of God to be that he is all-powerful and 
all-knowing. One of our hypotheses then should be H: an all-powerful 
and all-knowing personal being exists. To round out the set we take -H, 
the negation or rejection of H as the other hypothesis. In the discussion 
which follows, "theism" will refer to the belief that H is true and the 
belief that -H is true will be termed "the rejection of theism". 
A set of two hypotheses does not yield the most natural representation 
of views about the existence of deities who are personal beings. A more 
natural division of views produces four hypotheses. We can divide H or 
theism into two hypotheses by adding the attribute of benevolence to 
obtain classical theism. It is the view that the hypothesis Hct is true: a 
benevolent, all-powerful, and all-knowing personal being exists. But it is 
possible that an all-powerful and all-knowing personal being exists but is 
not benevolent. He might be indifferent or even malevolent. Thus we 
must add a second hypothesis Hnf a non-benevolent personal being that is 
all-powerful and all-knowing exists. Let us call this "non-classical theism". 
We can also divide -H or the rejection of theism into two hypotheses by 
providing an hypothesis for the view that supernatural personal beings 
with limited power or knowledge exist. Many people do not ascribe to the-
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ism but are polytheists. Thus Hp, is: supernatural personal beings with 
limited power or knowledge exist. The fourth hypothesis needed to form a 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive set is the hypothesis Ha: no supernatur-
al personal beings exist. This is the hypothesis atheists hold. Some other 
religious adherents who are not classified as atheists, many Buddhists for 
instance, would be in agreement. Pantheists are covered by this hypothe-
sis, since their beliefs admit a being that is supernatural in some sense but 
not personal. Although this hypothesis could be split further into more 
hypotheses, the analysis would become more complex without any basic 
change in the results or any gain in understanding. The religious beliefs of 
most people, if they are not agnostic, will identify them as holding one of 
the four hypotheses. As noted, the four hypotheses case is related to the 
two hypotheses case in the following way: theism or H combines the classi-
cal and non-classical theism hypotheses Hnt and Hct. The rejection of H, 
or -H, combines the atheism and polytheism hypotheses Ha and Hp' 
Although more complex sets of hypotheses could be defined, it seems 
doubtful that any advantage in clarity is to be gained by doing so. 
Specification of Evidence for Analysis 
In order to evaluate the argument, it is necessary to clarify the nature 
of the consent to which the argument appeals. The historical version 
appeals to actual belief in God by a majority of people. We are interested 
in whether the consensus gentium argument provides support for the exis-
tence of a personal being who is all-powerful and all-knowing. The evi-
dence can be formulated in various ways. One form the consensus gen-
tium evidence may take is: 
(M) The majority of people believe that an all-powerful and a11-
knowing personal being exists. 
As stated this implies that at least 50% of humankind (+1 person) 
believes an all-powerful and all-knowing personal being exists." M 
defines the common consent evidence as a simple majority of all people." 
Including the beliefs of all people is the simplest choice and is most easily 
related to the data currently available on religious belief. More complex 
representations of the evidence would require more complex analysis 
without changing the nature of the argument or the conclusions. III 
Evidence about whether people actually do believe in God's existence 
does not limit the possibilities. We might include in our evidence, not 
only a snapshot of the state of current belief, but also the trend over time. 
For example we might have evidence not only that a majority of people 
now believe God exists, but also that the percentage of those who believe 
has been increasing over a very long time. It is the trend of increasing 
belief that Cicero finds so compelling. Thus we might specify: 
(M') The majority of people believe that an all-powerful and a11-
knowing personal being exists and the percentage who believe has 
been increasing for centuries 
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as our evidence for the consensus gentium argument. A more specific 
statement might be made with percentages and levels of confidence and 
perhaps an average rate of increase per century for a given number of 
centuries. 
Evaluation of the Two Hypothesis Case 
As is clear from the analysis above, the validity of the two and four 
hypotheses versions of the argument turns on the relative value of the 
liklihoods. It is necessary therefore to take up the question of their rela-
tive value. For the two hypothesis version of the consensus gentium argu-
ment we must impose some constraints on the possible probability 
assignments for the liklihoods of Hand -H, that is, the probability of our 
common consent evidence M on Hand -H respectively. We are interest-
ed in probability assignments that are reasonable-that can be justified 
by plausible arguments. In the case of scientific hypotheses, deriving 
consequences is usually fairly straightforward. But when the hypothe-
ses concern the existence of supernatural beings and the probability 
assignments depend on the actions, purposes, and goals of such beings, 
the task of constraining the assignments for the liklihoods is much more 
problematic and speculative. Nevertheless, I believe that there are plau-
sible arguments which do justify imposing some constraints on the val-
ues of the liklihoods and, specifically, for concluding that a rational per-
son is quite justified in believing that the liklihood of H is greater than 
the liklihood of -H. 
Consider the situation if -H happens to be true-that God does not 
exist. Then it would be reasonable to assign some probability to the lik-
lihood of -H, that is, to the majority of people being theists and believing 
H to be true even though it is false. The appropriate probability value 
would depend on the various causal factors that we think would affect 
people's beliefs about God. The causal factors must be factors that may 
come into play. They must be appropriate on the basis of our back-
ground evidence when we do not know ·what people's beliefs about God hap-
pen to be. The hypothesis -H as stated allows for the existence of super-
natural beings although not beings which are all-powerful and all-
knowing. The supernatural beings could act in ways which would con-
vince some people that an all-powerful being was at work. 
Consequently, the factors which cause people to believe theism may 
have a naturalistic basis or a supernaturalistic basis. 
Next, let us consider the naturalistic and supernaturalistic causes pre-
sent in the -H case in comparison with the case if H or theism is true. It is 
not obvious that any of the naturalistic factors which tend to cause people 
to accept H if God did not exist, would cease to be present if God existed. 
Now consider the causes originating from supernatural action. If God 
exists he might have the same motives as the supernatural beings in the -H 
case to demonstrate his power. But if he did so he would be able to 
demonstrate far more power. We would expect him to convince more peo-
ple. If we knew that an all-powerful being existed, but not whether he is 
benevolent, indifferent, or malevolent, it seems that there should be a rea-
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sonably good probability that he would act in ways which would reveal 
his existence to people through answered prayer and implanted beliefs, 
but also some probability that he would not do so. Further, if an all-pow-
erful being did act to reveal his power we would expect a high probability 
that a majority would believe in his existence, since there are many things 
an all-powerful being could do to reveal himself. Thus, there is a non-zero 
probability that if H is true the supreme being is benevolent and there is a 
reasonable probability that if he is benevolent, he would want people to 
know the truth about his existence. There is also a non-zero probability 
that if H is true and the supreme being is not benevolent, he would act in 
ways that would provide people with evidence about his existence. The 
possibility that God will act in ways which provide sufficient evidence for 
people to believe he exists, adds a factor for the H case which increases the 
probability that the majority of people will believe God exists above the 
probability for the -H case. The liklihood of H must be greater than the lik-
lihood of -H. It follows from Bayes' Theorem that the posterior probability 
of H is greater than the prior probability of Hand M confirms H. The prob-
ability of the hypothesis of theism is greater if we know M to be trIle than if we just 
know all the other evidence. It also follows that the posterior probability of -H 
is less than the prior probability of -H and M disconfirms -H lowering the 
probability of views which reject theism. 
These results are independent of the prior probabilities of theism and 
the rejection of theism on the background evidence. It might be that the 
falsity of theism is more probable than its truth on available background 
evidence excluding M. Nevertheless, M will support theism and raise its 
probability, even though it may not raise the posterior probability of H 
above -H. On the other hand, if the prior probabilities of the two 
hypotheses on the background evidence happen to be equal or the theis-
tic hypothesis has a greater prior probability, then the posterior proba-
bility of H is greater than the posterior probability of -H. In any case, 
whatever values we would assign the prior probabilities, M confirms H 
and disconfirms -H. M provides confirmation for theism no matter what 
the prior probabilities for the hypotheses are, because the posterior proba-
bility has shown an increase over the prior probability. Thus, we can 
conclude that the consensus gentium argument based on evidence that a 
majority of people believe in the existence of an all-powerful God is an 
inductively valid argument. 
While the liklihood of H is greater than -H, the disparity in probability 
values may range from small to great depending on judgments made to 
evaluate the liklihoods. If one judges as unlikely that an all-powerful 
being would act in ways which would give people evidence that he exists, 
then the difference between the liklihoods will be quite small. If we judge 
these probabilities to have larger, and I think more reasonable values, a 
substantial difference in the values for the liklihoods of Hand -H will 
occur. Nietzsche, for example, argued that God had a moral duty to pro-
vide abundant evidence." If so, assigning .9 to the liklihood of H would 
seem reasonable. However, we cannot be so certain that the agenda and 
motives of a supreme being will make providing human beings with 
overwhelming evidence of his existence a top priority, especially since H 
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does not entail he is benevolent. A more pessimistic value of .3 for the lik-
lihood of H seems reasonable. If an all-powerful being does not exist, the 
probability of a majority being theists should be quite low. It is quite 
unlikely that a majority would come to believe theism, because there 
would be very little legitimate evidence for theism. In the following sec-
tion a number of arguments are offered to show that functionalist argu-
ments do not give grounds for expecting widespread theistic belief if -H is 
true. Also, an analysis on the background evidence E alone, prior to 
knowing which hypothesis is true, with very limited information about 
people's religious beliefs, using a classification of religious beliefs with 
three or more categories, indicates there is a very high probability that 
none of the beliefs will be in a majority. It warrants assigning majority 
belief in theism a probability less than .01.12 If we assign a more generous 
.1 to the liklihood of -H, the liklihood of Hat .3 will exceed the liklihood of 
-H by 200%. If our background evidence does not give us reason to prefer 
either hypothesis, that is, the prior probabilities of Hand -H are both .5, 
then a 200% larger value for the liklihood of H will yield a posterior prob-
ability for H of .75 and for -H of .25, a 50% increase and 50% decrease 
respectively. 
The liklihood of H always exceeds the liklihood of -H, but there is 
considerable variability in the degree to which it does, depending upon 
the considerations taken into account to evaluate the liklihoods. It is 
important to keep in mind that we are not dealing with probabilities 
whose value we can specify exactly. There is an inherent unavoidable 
subjectivity in evaluating inductive argument. When we assign proba-
bilities, we cannot generally assign a precise number, but we can, if we 
possess some relevant evidence, narrow it down to a range or make a 
judgment about which of two liklihoods should be greater. There will 
be some divergence between the values different persons assign to likli-
hoods on the same evidence. Nevertheless, after a discussion of various 
considerations which affect the probabilities, rational men and women 
should in most cases come to some rough agreement about the relative 
numerical values of two probabilities. 
Evaluation of the Liklihood of Ha for the Four Hypothesis Case 
Let us examine the liklihoods of Ha, H , Hnt, and Hct for the four 
hypothesis case. The first liklihood we wiR consider is the liklihood of 
Ha-the liklihood that atheism or another religious view rejecting the 
existence of supernatural personal beings is true. We need to reach con-
clusions about the probability that M is true-that the majority of people 
adopt a theist position, if we do not know what people believe about 
God, but do happen to know that neither God nor any other supernatur-
al personal beings exist. It is important to stress that to properly assign a 
value to the liklihood of Ha, we must place ourselves in the position of 
one who knows all that is currently known about human scientific 
accomplishments and the technical achievements of modern life, hap-
pens to have a way of definitively knowing that God does not exist, but 
does not know enough about human religious beliefs to have any idea how wide-
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spread belief in an all-knowing and all-powerful deity happens to be. 
For the liklihood of Ha as well as for the liklihoods of the other 
hypotheses, we must judge the probability that people's religious beliefs 
will either be true or be false beliefs. For many states of affairs it may be 
reasonable to assign a higher probability to a person having true rather 
than false beliefs about those states of affairs. If relevant evidence is 
available, we may have prima facie justification for thinking that from a 
set of alternative possible beliefs people are more likely to believe the 
one that is true than anyone of the possible false alternatives. One 
might note that Freud believed that in the long run people would follow 
reason and experience and discard religion. 13 People are able to test 
beliefs and winnow out many false beliefs. Scientists follow a method of 
formulating hypotheses, developing their consequences and testing the 
predictions. If the predictions are successful, the hypothesis is held to be 
true. If not, the hypothesis is false and is rejected. Many false beliefs are 
winnowed out by a process of trial and error until a true belief is found. 
The winnowing process occurs over long periods of time, although with 
modern communications, discovery of truths can lead to adoption of the 
new discoveries by majorities in a very short period of time. One might 
also expect a process similar to natural selection in biology to operate for 
human beliefs. Natural selection causes retention of genetic changes 
and mutations resulting in changes in animal and human physical char-
acteristics which are better adapted to the environment. One might 
expect that the most successful societies are more likely to have correct 
beliefs. An individual, group, or society may hit on a truth that allows 
manipulation of circumstances to yield practical results. As a result, 
that individual, group, or society may become more successful. 
Successful individuals now may be copied by other comparable individ-
uals or groups leading to success for the latter if the ideas are true. 
Successful organizations or groups often will also propagate themselves. 
When the success includes political or economic success, the successful 
groups have an increased capacity to produce and care for more chil-
dren who are taught the new correct ideas. Over many millenia they 
may multiply their contribution to the earth's population. In contrast 
we would expect organizations or groups that depend on false beliefs 
that can affect their capacity to survive to suffer more disasters and loss 
of life. The net result of all these factors will tend to raise the proportion 
of people who believe the truth and lower the proportion with false 
beliefs. Over a long period of time the changes can be quite dramatic. 
For example, at the beginning of the 19th century the primary economic 
theories were mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism. At that time only 
a small proportion of people would have accepted capitalism as the best 
economic system. However, within two centuries it has emerged victo-
rious, being recognized by the great majority of people as the best means 
to organize economic affairs. Considerations such as these provide 
grounds for thinking that for many matters of belief, including perhaps 
the realm of belief about the existence of deities, the truth is likely to win 
out in the end. 
Functional theories of religious belief offer a possible basis for object-
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ing to the claim that when the existence of God is at issue and people 
have a choice between several beliefs, they are more likely to choose the 
one that is true. Many writers, whether believing God exists or not, 
have argued that religious belief serves a function which is very benefi-
cial to society. It is argued that belief systems and myths held widely 
can provide a strong cohesiveness to societies. Religious teaching may 
encourage people to act more altruistically promoting the welfare of oth-
ers in the society. Some theistic religions might promote the most cohe-
siveness and the most altruism and lead to the most successful societies. 
Freud argued that society required religious doctrines to tame the aso-
cial instincts and to provide a sense of having a defense against the help-
lessness people feel when confronted by the activity of nature.14 One 
may argue that because such belief systems are beneficial to society, we 
should expect them to occur even if they are false. It may seem as likely 
that people would believe what is false in matters of religion as that they 
would believe what is true. On the basis of the functional theories some-
one might claim that if Ha is true and no supernatural personal beings 
do exist, there is still a high probability that M will be true-that the 
majority of people will believe that an all-powerful and all-knowing per-
sonal being exists. 
There are a number of arguments available which suggest that the 
putative benefits of religion and the need for religion by functioning 
societies have been greatly overplayed. First, many species of animals 
form societies and co-operate to protect themselves and protect their 
young without religion. Surely human societies could likewise have 
formed, grown and multiplied merely as a result of the great benefits of 
co-operation without forming religions. Second, if theism and polythe-
ism are not true, societies which relied on the aid of the supernatural 
beings ought to have been less successful than societies which did not. 
One would expect that over time the non-religious societies would be 
more successful and proliferate the most, with the result that belief in 
the supernatural would be small. Third, as Hume pointed out, virtually 
all early religion was polytheistic. 15 But polytheism is not a religion 
which tends to tame social instincts and promote altruism. The gods are 
poor examples. They do many unlawful things, which if copied by 
those who worship them, would result in severe punishment at the 
hands of the societies' government and legal system. In addition the ser-
vice of the gods requires offerings, but does not require any moral 
action.'6 Moral behavior in such societies is enforced by the government 
and legal system. This observation often applies to theistic religion as 
well. Fourth, it may very well be that there is a strong probability that 
polytheism would develop, if not to provide cohesiveness and promote 
altruism then in order to understand the world and from a tendency to 
project human activity onto nature. But there does not seem to be any 
necessity that theism would develop out of polytheism.17 
There are additional problems with appealing to the benefits of reli-
gion for evaluating the liklihoods. The main point which must be 
stressed concerning theories based on the societal benefits of religious 
belief is that the theories are problematic in this context because they 
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presuppose knowledge of people's religious beliefs--the kind of knowl-
edge reported by M. Functional theories are formulated to explain the 
widespread existence of religious beliefs. Those who formulate them do 
so from the standpoint of knowing what people's religious beliefs are, 
including knowing whether M is true or not. In this context this 
involves a kind of circular reasoning and is contrary to the ground rules 
for doing a Bayesian analysis of inductive inferences. The condition for 
evaluating the liklihoods for Hct and Ha is that the background evi-
dence E does not include M nor does any of the evidence in E entail M. 
We are interested in assessing the liklihood of hypotheses about God's 
existence and to do so we must exclude knowledge of people's beliefs 
about God and any evidence which would enable us to make inferences 
about those beliefs. We must assign the liklihood of Ha from a stand-
point of knowing the truth of Ha but not knowing the truth of M or any 
evidence which entails it. ls 
This restriction clearly rules out use of function theories as a basis for 
arguing that theism should be successful in the long run. Attempts to 
argue that over time theism should be more successful because theistic 
religions promote more cohesiveness and more altruism require estimat-
ing the number of current adherents to classical theism and require ref-
erence to the religious beliefs of current advanced societies. Such refer-
ences clearly violate the ground rules for evaluating the liklihoods. 
Moreover, it is not inherently obvious why those who believe in theism 
should be more successful than others, if theism is not true. The more 
successful advanced societies tend to be more tolerant. They tend to 
have more citizens with conflicting religious views which is a force that 
is often more divisive than cohesive. 
Perhaps some evidence upon which function theories are based can be 
included in E, for example, evidence anthropologists and historians have 
regarding the beliefs of primitive and ancient peoples which are tempo-
rally separated from us by millenia. I would argue that even this type of 
evidence should not be admitted because it is evidence about human 
beliefs about deities and has some relevance for projecting contemporary 
beliefs. Nevertheless, suppose that we admit it and conclude that for 
evaluating liklihoods we should expect religious views to be widespread. 
It is not clear, however, that evidence of the religious belief systems of 
primitive and ancient peoples provides grounds for assigning more than 
a minimal probability to the liklihood of Ha, that is, to the probability 
that a majority of people adhere to theism when supernatural beings do 
not exist. Even if it were true that the values of cohesiveness and promo-
tion of altruism may increase the probability that people in societies will 
adopt common religions, these values can be satisfied by non-theistic reli-
gions. A survey of religions of primitive peoples shows that most are 
polytheistic, the Israelites provide the only example of the adoption of a 
theistic religion. Cohesiveness results from adopting a set of common 
beliefs. It does not depend on claims about the power of the supernatur-
al beings worshipped. Nor is it clear that teachings on how to treat oth-
ers must be better intrinsically in theistic religions than in non-theistic 
religions. These considerations and the evidence of the beliefs of primi-
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tive and ancient peoples, if anything, tends to support increasing the 
probability that people would adopt polytheistic rather than theistic 
views and may render widespread atheistic disbelief in the existence of 
any supernatural beings less probable. It does not support assigning 
high probability to widespread belief in theism and M being true. 
In order to estimate an appropriate probability to assign to the likli-
hood of Ha one might adopt the following perspective. Before obtaining 
evidence about common consent, we may know only that beliefs must 
fall into one of several categories. People might be theists, polytheists, 
or those disbelieving in supernatural personal beings. With three or 
four categories and no information about actual belief or which hypoth-
esis is true, we might expect on the order of 1/4 to 1/3 of mankind to 
reject belief in supernatural beings. The probability that any group 
would form a majority would be very small. If we now take into 
account that we know Ha is true and prayers are never answered we 
might think it reasonable to hold that it is quite probable that over the 
course of centuries at least 1/3 of those who believe in the existence of 
supernatural personal beings would be converted to rejecting the exis-
tence of supernatural beings. This would raise the non-theist, non-poly-
theist group from a minority of mankind to the majority belief. If it is 
true not only that the all-powerful God of theistic religions does not 
exist, but that no supernatural beings with the power to answer prayers 
exist either, then people would not have any prayers they uttered 
answered. They of course might imagine that they had had some 
prayers answered due to a happy congruence of random events. 
However, in the face of reality one would expect that over time, the lack 
of actual answers to prayer would tend to cause belief in deities to die 
out. People who believe and rely on what is false are likely to have 
lower chances of survival. Tribes believing in a supreme being might 
expect that being to aid them in a crisis and be wiped out when no aid is 
forthcoming. Their religious beliefs therefore probably would have a 
lower probability of being passed on. The aggressive, hard-nosed real-
ists should inherit the earth. They should be more successful in provid-
ing for their needs and passing on their beliefs, if anyone should, than 
. the meek theists waiting for salvation from above. Theists would gradu-
ally be weeded out losing their land and livelihood to hard working no-
nonsense atheists. Thus if there are no supernatural personal beings, 
there is justification for raising the probability of the statement: 
(N) A majority of people believe there are no personal supernatur-
al beings. 
There is no basis for raising the probability of M, however."! The proba-
bility of M which is very low on evidence E alone, remains low if we 
know Ha is true. In summary, when we judge the liklihood of Ha (the 
probability of M given that Ha is true) without knowledge of people's beliefs 
about God, but with knowledge that no supernatural beings exist, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that, the probability that a majority of people are adherents to 
a theist position should be quite low-less than .1. After millions of years of 
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human existence, it seems quite unlikely that a majority of people would 
hold theistic beliefs or have tendencies to believe what is quite false. 
Evaluation of the Liklihood of Hct, Hnt, alld Hp for the Four Hypothesis Case 
When we consider the probability assignment for the liklihood of the 
classical theism hypothesis Bet (the probability of M given Bet) we can 
justifiably raise the probability that M is true significantly above the 
value we would assign if we did not know that Bet is true. If we know 
Bet to be true and if it is reasonable to believe that a benevolent being 
would disclose himself and answer prayers in sufficient quantity to affect 
human opinion or implant natural tendencies to believe the truth about 
supreme beings, then we might expect that it is probable that over time a 
considerable number of people would become convinced of the truth of 
theism.20 Although a benevolent being might conceivably want to remain 
totally hidden and undetectable, such behavior should be attributed to an 
indifferent being. Benevolent beings wish the best for others including 
knowing the truth. One would expect that an all-powerful and all-know-
ing being, if he is benevolent toward human beings, would want people 
to know the truth and create them with natural tendencies to believe 
what is true, including what is true about himself. A truly benevolent 
being who most likely was involved in their creation would want people 
to come to him for aid when in need. We would expect him frequently to 
answer prayer. If so, we might expect many people to believe that he 
had answered their prayers. Only about 1/4 of non-theists would need 
to be converted to theism over the course of centuries to raise theism 
from the mean of 1/3 of mankind to the majority belief. It does not seem 
unreasonable to think that this result is more probable than not, if theism 
is true. Thus there is a basis for increasing the probability of M from the 
value we would assign on the background evidence E alone, if we also 
know that Bct is true. For the special case of theism, the all-powerful 
being has the power at creation or later to implant and reveal truth about 
his own existence to human beings in ways that they can grasp. An all-
powerful being can communicate with human beings and respond to 
them. Be can answer their prayers. If there is a non-zero probability that 
he will do these things for many individuals, many may come to believe 
in his existence until a majority so believe. Consequently the probability 
of M may be very low on background evidence E alone, but should be 
raised when we know Bct to be true. 
The consequence of raising the probability of M allows us to conclude 
that M becomes significantly more probable if B ct is true than if Ha is 
true. Just as for the two hypothesis case, the existence of an all-powerful 
being with the capacity to influence human belief and to communicate 
with human beings and a non-zero probability that he would try to com-
municate with human beings raises the probability that M will be true-
that a majority of human beings will adopt a theist position. Because 
Bet includes benevolence, it seems justifiable to assign a higher proba-
bility for M than for B in the two hypothesis case. While it is possible a 
benevolent being might remain entirely aloof, it seems reasonable to 
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assign a relatively high non-zero probability to his acting to provide 
people with the capacity to know the truth. The liklihood might very 
well be quite high and it seems reasonable to think that M is more prob-
able than not under these circumstances. Nevertheless, at minimum, we 
would expect the probability of M if Hct is true to be greater than if Ha 
is true due to the additional causal factors present. 
What can we now infer regarding the liklihood of Hp which presup-
poses that supernatural beings with but limited power exist? The proba-
bility that a majority would believe in an all-powerful and all-knowing 
deity should not be greater, if a deity with those attributes does not exist 
than if a deity with those attributes plus benevolence exists. We would 
expect less reinforcement of belief through answers to prayer when H 
is true than when Hct is true, because there is some non-zero probability 
that a benevolent, all-powerful, and all-knowing deity would answer 
many prayers and requests requiring demonstration of more power than 
limited beings have. Supernatural beings of limited power might 
answer some or all prayers except those requiring power greater than 
the power they possess. They might be unable or simply unwilling to 
answer many prayers. They might not care about beings they did not 
have the power to create. They might torment people giving them what 
they do not want or even the opposite of what they asked for. 
Moreover, if deities have limited rather than unlimited power, it is less 
probable that people could or would be given special tendencies to 
believe that an all-powerful being exists. If H should be true, the 
actions of supernatural beings could lead to a mafority believing an all-
powerful being exists, but we would expect that over the course of many 
millenia of adapting to their environment, human beings would be more 
likely to align themselves with the truth than what is false. The outcome 
that a majority of people would come to believe in the existence of 
supernatural beings with limited power seems more likely than the out-
come that they would come to believe in an all-powerful God. 
The conclusion we reach is that we should expect that fewer people 
would exhibit belief in supernatural beings with unlimited power when 
Hct is false than when it is true, because there is less capacity and moti-
vation to communicate with, respond to, and influence human beings, 
than if an all-powerful and benevolent being exists. The various possi-
bilities suggest a moderately lower to significantly lower probability that 
M will be true if Hp is true than if Hct is true. On the other hand, the 
fact that there is some probability that some prayers would be answered 
which might cause some people to believe in all-powerful supernatural 
beings indicates assigning a higher probability to the liklihood of Hp 
than to the liklihood of Ha' Thus I conclude that it seems quite reasort-
able to hold that people would be more likely to reject theism than to 
accept it and the probability value for a majority of people believing in 
theism, if Hp is true, should be less than if Hct is true, but greater than if 
Ha is true. 
Analysis of the liklihoods is completed by considering the fourth likli-
hood, the liklihood of Hnt. If we consider the liklihood simply from the 
standpoint that we would expect human beings after many millenia of 
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learning to align themselves with the truth rather than with what is 
false, then because Hnt and Hct each imply theism is true, we would 
expect the same support for the truth of M for the hypothesis Hnt as for 
Hct. However, if an all-powerful being exists, the probability we should 
assign to a majority believing an all-powerful being exists depends also 
on our expectations about the probable interaction with human beings 
arising from the benevolence, indifference, or malevolence of the super-
natural being. If anything, we would expect the probability of M if Hnt 
is true to be less than if Hct is true, because we would expect non-benev-
olent beings on balance to be less motivated to communicate the truth to 
people or to provide them the capabilities to discern the truth. Of 
course, an all-powerful malevolent being might do more to convince 
people of his existence and power than a possibly benevolent but hidden 
all-powerful being. In general though we should expect the motives of a 
benevolent being to cause him to do more to cause people to know the 
truth than would malevolent or indifferent beings of comparable power. 
The reasons for thinking that people would come to believe that an all-
powerful being exists are weaker, if an existing all-powerful being is not 
benevolent. There is a lower probability such a being would want peo-
ple to know the truth and would try to communicate the truth about 
himself to people. There is also a lower probability that he would want 
to help people, to communicate with them, and to answer their prayers. 
A malevolent being might diabolically remain hidden as he torments 
people. An indifferent being would be less likely than a benevolent 
being to act in ways which would provide sufficient evidence for a 
majority of people to come to believe he exists. On the other hand, the 
fact that there is some non-zero probability that supernatural beings 
would communicate with human beings or respond to them in some 
fashion warrants assigning a higher probability to the liklihood of Hnt 
than to the liklihood of Ha' With respect to assigning a probability, 
about all we can say is that it should probably be a value less than the 
liklihood of Hct, but greater than the liklihood of Ha' 
The conclusion that we can draw is that the liklihood of Hct has the 
highest probability, the liklihood of Ha has the lowest probability, and 
the liklihoods of Hand Hnt are intermediate between them.21 Thus the 
four hypothesis ve~ion of the consensus gentium argument is valid if we 
know that the value for the liklihood of Hct is the greatest of the four lik-
lihoods. At bottom the difference between a supreme personal being 
existing and not existing is that, if he exists, there are additional causal 
factors which may cause people to believe that he exists. The potential 
causes and effects which cannot be present if God does not exist, raise 
the liklihood of Hct over the other liklihoods. The existence of this inequal-
ity relation is all that really matters for the argument to work. 
There are some additional consequences relevant to the function theo-
ry evidence (if it is admitted). If we admit the function theory evidence 
of the beliefs of primitive and ancient peoples, the evidence may tend to 
support increasing the probability that people would adopt polytheistic 
rather than theistic views. Because this tends to decrease the probability 
of theistic belief, that is, of the probability of M relative to all four 
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hypotheses, it decreases the liklihoods for all hypotheses unifonnally rather than 
relative to one another. So it seems any admissable evidence supporting 
function theories would justify assigning a high probability for the truth 
of a proposition other than M, for example, that a majority of people are 
polytheists, and a low probability for M. Moreover, a uniform lowering of 
the probabilities of the four liklihoods has the effect of increasing confirmation for 
Hct .22 In any case, appealing to the functional value of religious belief 
does not raise the probability of M on the various hypotheses under con-
sideration, and, in particular, not the liklihood of Ha. 
The LiklillOods when our E7Jidl'nce is of the Type Expressed by M' 
What can we say about the liklihoods of Hand -H if our evidence is 
M' which includes evidence of a long-term trend of increasing belief in 
theism? It seems obvious that if we know that -H is true--that God does 
not exist, we should expect the long-term trend to be decreasing rather 
than increasing, or at least stable. With people becoming more educated 
world-wide and with advancements in knowledge in scientific and tech-
nical fields, it would be surprising that increasing numbers are adopting 
false theism rather than truly rejecting theism. We would expect M' to 
be even more improbable than M. The fact that majority belief in theism 
is increasing is more unlikely than evidence that a majority believe per 
se. Thus the liklihood of -H with the evidence of M is greater than the 
corresponding liklihood with the evidence M'. So we should assign a 
low probability to discovering M' to be true when we are given -H&E. 
For the liklihood of H, an increasing percentage of theists is just what 
we might expect, if we know H to be true. We should expect increasing 
belief to be more probable than majority belief per se. Thus the liklihood 
of H with the evidence of M is less than the corresponding liklihood with 
the evidence M'. It follows that because the disparity between the liklihoods of 
Hand -H with M' as evidence is greater than for evidence M, possession of evi-
dence for M' provides stronger confirmation than does M. It is evident also 
that the inequality relations among the liklihoods which held for the four 
hypotheses case with M as evidence will hold also for M' as well. The 
disparity between the liklihoods for classical theism and atheism will also 
be greater for M' than for M by the same reasoning applicable to the two 
hypotheses case. 23 
As stated earlier, the statement of the common consent evidence could 
be much more complex. The evidence might be stated as a conjunction of 
statements reporting the numbers of people belonging to the different 
categories of belief. For statements indicating the existence of a greater 
number of theists than other categories of belief, the Bayesian analysis 
will show confirmation for theism.24 
Some Examples 
At this point I will illustrate some implications of the preceding 
analysis by offering several examples with probability assignments 
which make the liklihood of Hct the greatest, and the liklihood of Ha the 
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least, for the four hypotheses case, and the liklihood of H greater than 
the liklihood of -H for the two hypotheses case.2; The assignments for the 
examples are intended to be illustrative only. The examples make the impli-
cations of the application of Bayes' Theorem more concrete. They pro-
vide a sense of the strength of the support for each alternative hypothe-
sis provided by the consensus gentium evidence. Since we are only inter-
ested here in the support provided by the common consent evidence, we 
will suppose that the prior probabilities on the background evidence E 
for the hypotheses are equal. For the four hypotheses version we assign 
.25 as a neutral value for the prior probabilities and for the two hypothe-
ses version we assign .5. 
For the first example we rely on the arguments above against func-
tionalism and the analysis given in Endnote 12 for assigning a very low 
probability to widespread theistic belief if Ha is true. Let us assume also 
that after centuries of potential activity by a benevolent supreme being 
people would have considerable evidence for his existence and a value 
for the liklihood of Hct of .5 or more seems reasonable. Although 
Nietzsche and other atheists would probably want a much higher value, 
a being that is so far above us in knowledge might have an agenda 
which does not give top priority to providing human beings with 
uncontestable evidence of his existence. We assign the values .5, .35, .14, 
and .01 to the liklihoods Hct, Hnt, Hp ' and Ha respectively. Then the 
resulting posterior probabilities for the corresponding hypotheses are .5, 
.35, .14, and .01. Classical theism represented by Hct undergoes a 100 
percent increase in probability, while the probability of Ha falls to 4% of 
its previous value. 26 With liklihood assignments such as these the con-
sensus gentium argument has significant force, providing strong confir-
mation for classical theism and strong disconfirmation for the belief that 
there are no supernatural personal beings. Evidence that majorities of 
people believe classical theism should be taken seriously. 
As a second example suppose that we, in response to the urging of 
Nietzsche and other atheists, assign a very high probability to the likli-
hood of Hct' namely, .9 and a slightly higher probability of .1 to the likli-
hood of Ha and that the values .9, .5, .5, and .1 now represent the likli-
hoods Hcv Hni' Hp' and Ha' The posterior probabilities .f?r Hct, ~nt' 
Hp' and Ha now become: .45, .25, .25, and .05. The probabihty of theIsm 
equals .7 and the probability of -H is .3.27 Classical theism represented 
by Hct has undergone an 80 percent increase in probability, while the 
probability of Ha has sustained an 80% decrease in probability. The 
probability of theism is up 40 percent from its prior probability and the 
probability of -H is down 40 percent from its prior probability. This 
reflects the fact that the consensus gentium argument provides stronger 
confirmation for classical theism than for theism per se and greater dis-
confirmation for atheism and other views rejecting supernatural person-
al beings than the simple rejection of theism. 
Suppose now that someone does not accept the arguments for a low 
liklihood for Ha' He or she believes that functionalist arguments war-
rant giving the liklihood of Ha a much higher value, say,.4. We now 
assign the liklihoods H ct' Hni' H p' and Ha the values .9, .6, .5, and .4. 
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The posterior probabilities for Hct, Hnt, H R, and Ha now become: .38, 
.25, .21, and .17. Classical theism representea by Hct has undergone a 50 
percent increase in probability, while the probability of Ha has sustained 
a 33% decrease in probability. There is still confirmation for classical 
theism, but it is not as strong when the liklihood values have been undu-
ly inflated in this way.2' 
ls the Valid Consensus Gentium Argument Also Sound? 
If the consensus gentium argument is to have usefulness, it must not 
merely be valid, but also sound. It is sound only if we actually possess 
the evidence M or M'. The question which remains, then, is whether the 
evidence actually does show that M or M' are true. Because the evi-
dence required to make a definitive judgment has not been collected in a 
scientific manner either in sufficient quantity or quality, I shall not 
attempt to make any definitive pronouncements. This must be reserved 
for some time in the future when much more comprehensive evidence 
has been collected. Nevertheless I do believe there is sufficient evidence 
to believe M and M' are true. In the future, if the long-term trends con-
tinue and more comprehensive and accurate public opinion and psycho-
logical data is available for the world population, it is likely that we will 
be in a position to make more definitive judgments about the soundness 
of the consensus gentium argument. 
Let us consider the available statistics. The data which do exist seem 
to show that M is true. If we could use the U.S. opinion poll data as our 
basis, the answer would be a resounding "yes". For example, a Gallup 
Poll in 1971 indicated 98% of the people in the United States believed in 
God's existence.2c; More recent surveys show about 95% of the U.s. pop-
ulation believes God exists.") Most other countries in which scientific 
surveys were taken also have large majorities of theists.]l 
It is really the world population as a whole that is at issue, however. 
The best indication of belief in God for the world population is given by 
estimates of adherents to the various world religions. For the world as a 
whole, the 1997 Encyclopedia Britannica provides estimates of the number 
of adherents for the various world religions. Out of a total world pop-
ulation of 5.80 billion, there are an estimated 3.10 billion adherents to the 
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faiths which are dearly theistic. Thus at 
least 53 percent are estimated to be theists. The Sikhs and other people 
who are theists but are believed to be adherents of religions which are 
not really theistic may add a couple of percentage points. It is possible 
also that some people categorized as non-religious may believe theism is 
true. The non-theist group could comprise as much as about 47 percent 
of the world population. 
We should be cautious with these numbers. The estimates are based on 
various assumptions. They are not based on survey data for many groups 
of people. Also, care is in order for the people classified as non-religious. 
It is difficult to assess how extensive this group is, for many of the people 
who apparently belong in the category of non-theists live or have lived 
until recently under totalitarian governments where there has been heavy 
290 Faith and Philosophy 
indoctrination in atheism and strong penalties for expressing belief in 
God. Now that the former Soviet Union provides freedom of religion, 
more of its citizens may be theists than is reflected in the numbers. China 
still has harsh penalties for adherents of Christianity. Membership in a 
church is dangerous. There may be more Chinese who do believe in God 
and would express this belief if they had greater freedom of expression, 
than are reflected in the numbers. We might consider excluding some 
people from our estimates because the information is somewhat unreli-
able or because their beliefs probably have been partially coerced and sub-
ject to indoctrination. The population of China is about 1.2 billion. Of this 
.84 billion were classified in the non-religious and atheist categories. If we 
excluded only the people in the People's Republic of China from the totals 
because the data are unreliable and probably skew the results, then of the 
remaining 4.6 billion people, 67 percent are classified as theists, 6 percent 
are atheists or non-religious, and the remaining 27 percent believe in 
supernatural beings, but are not theists. 
It is interesting that there are actually relatively few outright atheists. 
They are estimated to total .22 billion or 3.8 percent of the world popula-
tion. Moreover, nearly all reside in China or countries in the former Soviet 
Union where the populations have been subjected to heavy indoctrination. 
The atheists in other countries are less than 1 percent of world population. 
The estimated size of the group which would reject the existence of super-
natural beings, if one includes atheists and the non-religious, is 1.11 billion 
or 19 percent. Adding some Buddhists will augment the total by one or 
two percentage points. The remaining non-theists are Hindus or adherents 
of a variety of other religions which are mostly polytheistic in nature. 
Do we have evidence for M'--that theistic belief has been increasing 
over time? It is quite clear that it has been. If we go back in time, the 
evidence on this point, which is sketchy even now, becomes of course 
far more sketchy. However, some rough estimates can be made. In the 
time of Christ, theistic belief was probably limited primarily to the Jews, 
who probably represented less than 4 percent of the estimated 300 mil-
lion world population.l3 Even if we also allow for many Hindus and 
educated pagans effectively being theists, it is doubtful that theists could 
have accounted for more than 10 percent of the world population. 
The year 1800 is a more recent year for which a very rough estimate can 
be made. Because the areas populated by European and Semitic peoples 
(plus an appropriate fraction of population in India-Pakistan, Indonesia, 
and Southeast Asia estimated to be Muslim) cannot have accounted for 
much more than 35 percent of world population, it is doubtful that theists 
could have comprised more than about 1/3 of world population in 1800. 
This is probably an upper bound. The true number could be below 30%. 
Since theists now apparently comprise a majority, the long-term trend has 
been increasing. M' therefore appears to be true also. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the consenSllS gentium argument in the form based on M 
and M' has proven inductively valid from the standpoint of a Bayesian 
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analysis of inductive reasoning. Classical theism receives stronger sup-
port than a definition of theism which does not incorporate the attribute 
of benevolence. Consequently, if there is adequate justification for 
believing either M or M' is true, there will be support for God's exis-
tence, and the argument will be sound. Since, to my knowledge, proper-
ly conducted studies of the evidence relevant to M and M' have not been 
undertaken for the world population as a whole, the best one can do is 
to make a subjective assessment on the evidence readily available. The 
evidence available does seem to show that M and M' are probably true. 
The available statistical data tend to show that the majority of people are 
classical theists or have a natural tendency to accept classical theism. 
Indeed, if the long-term trend of increasing theist belief continues and 
use of opinion polls spreads world-wide, it may not be too long before 
we will be in a position to pronounce unequivocally that the consensus 
gentium argument is sound. Hence it seems reasonable to think that the 
consensus gentium argument does provide support for God's existence. 
Yet whether or not M and M' are true and a version of the argument is 
sound, it is clear that the consensus gentium argument is not a fallacious 
inductive argument, but is inductively valid and as an argument has far 
greater merit than is usually supposed. 
Fullerton, CA 
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1. Paul Edwards, "Common Consent Arguments for the Existence of 
God," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. It p. 147. 
2. A thorough discussion and justification for holding that a Bayesian 
approach is needed to satisfactorily explicate scientific and inductive reason-
ing is to be found in Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach by Colin 
Howson and Peter Urbach, (LaSalle, Ill.:Open Court, 1993). 
3. This approach to reasoning to God's existence is covered thoroughly 
in The Existence of God by Richard Swinburne (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). 
4. If Pr(A) is the probability that a statement A is true, the conditional 
probability Pr(A/B) is the probability that A is true when B is given or 
already known to be true. By definition Pr(A/B) = Pr(A&B) /Pr(B). If Mis 
our inductive evidence and E is the background evidence, the prior probabil-
ity of an hypothesis Hi then is Pr(Hj/E). The liklihood is Pr(M/Hi&E) and 
the posterior probability is Pr(H· /M&E). 
5. Bayes' Theorem is simply a consequence of the definition of condi-
tional probability. To apply Bayes' theorem, the set of hypotheses Hi (j=1, 2 
.. n) relative to which we are examining evidence must form a mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive set. Let S equal the sum of the products of the likli-
hood and prior probability, that is, the sum of the n Pr(M/Hi&E)Pr(Hj/E) 
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terms for the n hypotheses Hi. For a set of two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive hypotheses, H =Hl and -H = H2' 5 becomes: 
5 == Pr(M/H1&E)Pr(Hl/E)+Pr(M/H2&E)Pr(H2/E). 
1/5 is the constant factor. For a four hypothesis case, 5 will have four terms. 
By assumption we know the background evidence to be true. Pr(E) therefore 
has a probability of 1 which entails by the definition of conditional probabili-
ty that the probabilities Pr(Hi&E) and Pr(H/E) are equal and can be inter-
changed in the formulas. Bayes' Theorem for Hi which is derived from the 
definition of conditional probability is 
Pr(H/M&E) = Pr(M/Hi&E)Pr(H/E)(1/5) 
where 5 as given above is the sum of the products of the liklihood and prior 
probability for all the hypotheses Hi. 
6. "Confirmation" here does not imply that the support is adequate to 
justify holding an hypothesis. It may be adequate. But the term only implies 
that it provides support by increasing the probability of the hypothesis. 
Similarly "disconfirmation" here does not imply that the evidence is ade-
quate to justify rejecting an hypothesis. It may be sufficient. Use of the term 
just means that it decreases the probability of the hypothesis. 
7. This is demonstrated as follows. The prior probabilities in the terms 
of S must sum to 1 because the probabilities of the hypotheses Hi must sum 
to 1 (the Hi are mutually exclusive and exhaustive). The prior probabilities 
therefore act as weights. It is evident that the greatest value S can attain 
occurs if a prior probability equals 1 and the liklihood for that hypothesis is 
the liklihood with the greatest probability. S would then equal that liklihood 
since all other terms are zero. However, the prior probabilities cannot equal 
one since contrary to assumption the hypothesis would be entailed by the 
evidence. Thus S < Pr(M/Hi&E) where Pr(M/Hj&E) is the liklihood with 
the highest probability. A similar argument shows S > Pr(M/Hi&E) where 
Pr(M/Hi&E) is the liklihood with the lowest probability. This has a very 
straightforward consequence for a two hypothesis case. If we can show or 
have good grounds to think that one of the two liklihoods is greater than the 
other, say the liklihood of H is greater than -H, then Pr(M/ -H&E) < S < 
Pr(M/H&E). Consequently Pr(M/H&E)/S > 1 > Pr(M/-H&E)/S and from 
Bayes' Theorem it follows that Pr(H/M&E) > Pr(H/E), or M confirms H. 
Thus for a two hypothesis case all that is necessary is to determine which lik-
lihood is greater and we can determine immediately from Bayes' theorem 
that its hypothesis is supported by the evidence M. It also follows that the 
evidence disconfirms the other hypothesis. If there are more than two 
hypotheses, matters are a little more complicated, but it still must be the case 
that of the liklihoods for the the hypotheses, the one with the highest proba-
bility must be greater than S and the liklihood with the lowest probability 
must be less than S. Hence the Pr(M/Hi &E)/S factor with the liklihood with 
the highest probability must exceed 1 and Bayes' Theorem shows that the 
evidence M provides confirming evidence for that hypothesis Hi. Similarly 
the Pr(M/Hi &E)/S factor for the liklihood with the lowest probability musf 
be less than 1 and the evidence M provides disconfirming evidence for that 
hypothesis Hi. Thus for a four hypothesis case, if we can determine which 
liklihood is greatest, we can determine from Bayes' theorem that its hypothe-
sis is supported by the evidence M. If we know that a liklihood is greater 
than the reciprocal of the constant factor then it will provide confirmation. If 
it is less it will disconfirm it. 
8. The actual evidence will be a statistical estimate based on statistical 
samples of human opinion polls. Estimates are subject to error. If very thor-
ough polls with representative samples are taken, sampling errors will be 
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small. Thus we might find, for example that after thorough polling of 
humankind that 55% are theists and that we have 99% confidence that the 
correct value exceeds 50%, that is, that M is true. We could devise a more 
specific statement of M giving estimated values and statistical confidence lev-
els. To do so would introduce an unnecessary amount of complexity. M as 
stated is sufficient to bring out the essential features of the argument. 
9. Some might desire the people polled be limited to those who are edu-
cated or to those who specialize in the philosophy of religion. For some sub-
ject matters, e.g. theories of quantum mechanics the views of non-specialists 
are clearly irrelevant. However, it is not evident that for questions related to 
the existence of an all-powerful God, the views of average people can be 
judged irrelevant. God might conceivably give them evidence of his exis-
tence. Can one be sure he will provide evidence only to the learned? Besides 
who should determine the criteria for selecting the population whose views 
are to be sampled? The results might tend to be biased from the method 
used to select the population. 
10. As stated M does not specify the exact level of belief. M may be stat-
ed more exactly as, say: 53% of the world population are theists. It is also 
possible to include the level of disbelief. For example, the evidence M could 
be: 53% of the world population are theists and 47% do not believe theism is 
true(to simplify we ignore the undecideds). Or, a more exact statement yet 
would be: 
(M*) Of the world population, 53 percent are classical theists(believe 
Hct)' 28 percent believe H ,4 percent are atheists(believe Ha), 0 per-
cent are non-classical theisPsCbelieve Hnt), and 15 percent are agnostic 
or non-religious. 
The difficulty raised is that we now have to evaluate liklihoods which are 
very specific values, for example, that on hypothesis Ha there will be exactly 
53% theists and 47% non-theists. There is enough subjectivity involved that 
we are not in a position to assign probabilities to the liklihoods for such spe-
cific statements of the evidence very well. One might also differentiate with 
ranges. For example, consider the statement M**: 
(M**) Of the world population, between 50 and 60 percent are classical 
theists(believe Hct), between 20 and 30 percent believe H , less than 10 
percent are atheists(believe Ha), 0 percent are non-classical~heists(believe 
Hnt), and between 10 and 20 percent are agnostic or non-religious. 
Notes 24 and 28 show that evidence statements of this form will also provide 
confirmation for classical theism. 
11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 53. 
12. There are various methods we could use to estimate the probability 
that M is true if we have very limited information to go on-little more than 
the fact that beliefs are highly dependent on the beliefs of the community in 
which one grows up. If we begin with the question of the probability of M 
versus the probability that the majority of people are not theists, then we 
might assign a 50% probability to each. However, it does not seem natural to 
lump polytheists and atheists in the same category. We should use at least 3 
categories of belief. This results in much lower probabilities for majority 
belief. We might take account of the fact that the 75 most populous countries 
comprise about 94% of mankind and the 75 major linguistic groups about 
87%. (Based on the World Data section of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1997 
Yearbook, pp. 762-767, 776-780.) This suggests that we can distinguish about 
75 to 90 major ethnic groups that comprise over 90% of mankind. Although 
the groups vary in population size, we might make a simple model based on 
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75 major ethnic groups and assume them to be equal and their beliefs about 
ultimate things to be homogeneous. If we consider at least three categories of 
religious belief: theism, polytheism, and denial of supernatural personal 
beings, and assign all individuals in each of the 75 groups distinguished by 
the model to one of the three categories, randomly, with a 113 probability for 
each, the mean for each should be (25 groups) or 113 of mankind. The proba-
bility that a majority (38 groups) holds anyone of the three options would 
have to be at least 3 standard deviations above the mean. For each category, 
the probability is consequently less than 1 percent that the adherents form a 
majority of world population. Hence, the probability that none of the three 
views are held by a majority should be greater than 97%. Thus on the back-
ground evidence E alone, prior to knowing which hypothesis is true, we 
would expect to assign a very low probability to M being true. If we then 
add Hat H ,Hntt or Hct!o E and estimate from the standpoint of knowing 
which of tl-R. hypotheses Hat Hp ' Hnl! or Hct is true, the probability of Mean 
be raised from .01 and assigned a higher value if the hypothesis gives us rea-
son to think that more evidence should be available to enable people to come 
to a knowledge of the truth. 
13. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an lllusion, trans. James Strachey (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1961), p. 69. 
14. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. James Strachey (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1961), especially pp. 7-10, 20-24, 29, 30, 47. 
15. David Hume, The Natural History of Religion in Dialogues and The 
Natural History of Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 135. 
16. Ibid., pp. 177-83. 
17. Ibid. Hume presents his theory about the origin of polytheism pp. 
138-41 and his theory of how theism originated from polytheism pp. 154-55. 
Although the theory has some plausibility and is a possible explanation of 
the origin of theism, the transition from polytheism to theism does not 
appear to be necessary or perhaps even likely. 
18. Appealing to functionalist theories to estimate the liklihood is tanta-
mount to determining the probability to assign to Pr(M/M&Ha&E) which 
equals 1 rather than to estimating Pr(M/Ha&E). 
19. The analysis in Note 12 indicates a probability of .01 for the liklihood 
of H to be warranted. 2& If Ha happens to be true-that supernatural personal beings do not 
exist, we can assign the probability c to the majority of people believing the-
ism even though it is false. The probability value assigned to c depends on 
the various causal factors that may come into play that we think would affect 
people's beliefs about God when we do not know what people's beliefs about God 
happen to be. If c is the probability value for the liklihood of Ha, what proba-
bility should then be assigned to the liklihood of Hct? If Hct is true, there are 
two cases: a) an all-powerful benevolent being exists and does not act in 
ways which human beings are capable of detecting, and b) an all-powerful 
benevolent being exists and does act in ways which human beings are capa-
ble of detecting. For the first case God does not act in ways which change the 
human epistemic situation from the Ha case. It is not obvious that any of the 
factors which tend to cause people to become theists and make c a good 
assignment if God did not exist, would cease to be present if God existed. 
The probability should be the same as for the Ha. case, namely c. If the sec-
ond case holds and God does act in ways whiCh provide evidence for his 
existence which would not be present if he did not exist, then we should 
assign a probability value b to the majority of people being theists where b > 
c. There is an additional factor present in the Hct case which increases the 
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probability that the majority of people will believe God exists above the 
probability for the Ha case. We can combine the two cases to estimate the 
liklihood of Hct if we consider that there is a non-zero probability that an a1l-
powerful benevolent being, if he existed, would provide people with suffi-
cient evidence to attain true beliefs about his existence. If this probability is 
d, then an appropriate estimate of the liklihood of H t might be found by the 
sum of the probabilities for the two cases weighted by the probability that it 
occurs: Pr(M/H t&E) = db + (l-d)c. If d is not equal to 0 and b > c, nwltiply-
ing both sides ofb > c by d and adding (l-d)c to both sides yields db + (l-d)c 
> c. But this is just Pr(M/l-!ct&E) > Pr(M/Ha &E). The liklihood of Hct is 
greater than the liklihood of H . 
21. Symbolically Pr(M/I1ct&E) > Pr(M/Hp&E) > Pr(M/Ha&E) and 
Pr(M/Hct&E) > Pr(M/Hnt&E) > Pr(M/Ha&E). 
22. To see this assign .25 to the four priors and Pr(M/Hct& E) = .5, 
Pr(M/H t& E) = .3, Pr(M/H & E) = .3, and Pr(M/Ha & E) =.1. Then Pr(Hct/~&E) = .42 and is a 61610 increase over the prior and Pr(H /M&E) = 
.08 and is a 67% decrease from the prior. Subtract .05 from the fiklihoods. 
Then Pr(Hct/M&E) = .45 and represents an 80% increase over the prior and 
Pr(Ha/M&E) = .05 and is an 80% decrease from the prior showing greater 
confirmation and disconfirmation respectively for Hct and Ha' Raising all 
four liklihoods an equal amount, for example by .1, can reduce the strength 
of support for theism, for example, using .6, .4, .4, and .2 for the four likli-
hoods yields Pr(Hct/M&E) = .375 and Pr(Ha/M&E) = .125 which represent 
merely a 50% increase and decrease for Hct and Ha respectively. Then even 
if we did allow the admissable evidence for functionalism to be used to 
increase rather than decrease the four liklihoods, we would not alter the funda-
mental relationship between liklihoods that makes the consensus gentium 
argument a valid argument. Whatever the value of the liklihood of Hw the 
liklihood of Hct must be higher yet, and in fact the highest of the four likli-
hoods. Whether or not an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent person-
al being exists, if we accept any evidence of the functional benefits of reli-
gious belief as part of the background evidence, then the probability of the 
liklihood for Hct is no lower than for Ha since the same causal forces such as 
societal cohesiveness and promotion of altruism would be operative in either 
case. But in addition, the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and 
benevolent personal being increases the probability that people will believe 
that he exists, because his existence taken together with a non-zero probabili-
ty that he would make an effort to communicate the truth about himself to 
people raises the the probability for the liklihood of Hct over the probability 
for the liklihood of Ha' The argument still works, although a uniform rise in 
liklihood probabilities may weaken the force of the evidential support. 
23. This means that the liklihood values satisfy the following relation: 
Pr(M' /H&E) > Pr(M/H&E) > Pr(M/-H&E) > Pr(M' /-H&E). 
24. If the evidence is stated so that the number of persons belonging to 
each category of belief are distinguished (as in M** of Note 10), then arguments 
similar to those given in the text will show confirmation for theism. If Ha were 
true, we would expect that after millions of years of the struggle for survival, 
the vast majority of surviving persons would either be atheists or non-religious 
since realists would be more likely to survive than those who put their trust in 
the aid of supernatural beings. One should expect the percentages of people 
who believe Hct' Hnt, or H to be low and the atheists and agnostics to be 
high. By analysis corresporlaing to that presented in the text, the difference 
between the observed percentages and the expected percentages will cause the 
posterior probability of Ha to come out less than its prior probability. 
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In the case of H t(or H), the Iiklihood of M** on H t(or H) and E will be 
higher than its likli~ood on Ha and E or on H and if, because M** reports 
that there are twice as many people who believfHct(or H) than believe either 
H or H . This conforms much more closely with what we would expect if H~t(or fB were true. This fact will cause the posterior probability of Hct(or 
HJ after learning of M** to be greater than its prior probability. Of course, 
the degree of support would be yet greater if 90 percent of the world popula-
tion were classical theist. Nevertheless, M** provides support for Hct and H 
and makes the consensus gentium argument valid. 
2S. That is, Pr(M/Hct&E) > Pr(M/H &E) > Pr(M/H &E) and 
Pr(M/H.ct&E) > Pr(M/H,nt&E) > Pr(M/Ha&Ef for the four hyporheses case 
and Pr(M/H&E) > Pr(M/-H&E) for the two hypotheses case. 
26. If we assign a significantly lower probability to the liklihood of Hct' 
the degree of confirmation can still be quite strong. For example, let us 
assign the values .1, .06, .03, and .01 to the liklihoods Hct, Hntt Hp ' and Ha 
respectively. Then the resulting posterior probabilities for the corresponding 
hypotheses are .S, .3, .1S, and .OS. Classical theism represented by H t under-
goes a 100 percent increase in probability, while the probability of ifa falls to 
20% of its previous value. 
27. To provide additional insight into the relation between the two 
hypotheses version and the four hypotheses versions we use probability 
assignments for the two hypotheses case which agree with the assignments 
offered for the four hypotheses case. Pr(H/E) == Pr(Hct/E)+ Pr(HntlE) == .S 
and Pre-HIE) == Pr(H /E)+ Pr(H /E) == .S. If Pr(M/Hct&E) == .9, 
Pr(M/Hnt&E) = .5, Pr(MJH..R&E) = .5, ~nd Pr(M/Hq&E) =.1 and we average 
Pr(M/Hct&E) and Pr(M/ t:t.nt&E) to estimate PnM/H&E) and average 
Pr(M/H &E) and Pr(M/H_&E) to estimate Pr(M/-H&E), we obtain 
Pr(M/HIE) = .7, and Pr(M/ -fi&E) = .3. The resulting posterior probabilities 
for Hand -H are .7 and .3. 
28. More complex representations of the consensus gentium evidence will 
also show support for classical theism even if there is also substantial disbelief 
in theism. For example, Nietzsche and other atheists who believe that God 
has a moral duty to present overwhelming evidence might claim that if God 
exists he should proVide plenty of evidence so that we should expect 90+% to 
be theists and less than 10% to be non-theists. It might then seem to them 
that if we obtain evidence that theists are in the SO-60% range and non-theists 
in the 40-S0% range, then the evidence ought not to confirm theism. 
However, evidence of SO-60% theists would still provide evidence confirming 
theism. To be sure, if we should assign a higher liklihood to 90+% theists than 
SO-60% theists, finding evidence that more than 90% are theists would then 
provide stronger confirmation than evidence of SO-60(10 theists. To see more 
clearly how this works, let us define MO as: 0-10% of the world population are 
theists and 90-100% are non-theists. We then define Ml: 10-20% of the world 
population are theists and 80-90% are non-theists, and define M2 as: 20-30% of 
the world population are theists and 70-80% are non-theists, and so on for M3 
through M9. Thus MS would be: SO-60% of the world population are theists 
and 40-S0% are non-theists, and M9: 90-100% of the world population are the-
ists and 0-10% are non-theists. To keep things reasonably simple we ignore 
agnostics and undecideds. For each of the ten statements of the evidence MO 
through M9 there are four liklihoods we can evaluate. For MS we must evalu-
ate Pr(MS/Hct&E), Pr(MS/Hnt&E), Pr(MS/H &E), and Pr(MS/H &E). The 
analysis of the feasible liklihood assignments for the evidence M gas shown 
that Pr(M/Hct&E) must have the highest probability value and Pr(M/Hjl.&E) 
must have the lowest value. This relation must hold also for the evidence 
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statements MO through M9. Thus for n = 0, 1,2, ... ,9, Pr(Mn/Hct&E) is 
greater than Pr(Mn/Hnt&E), Pr(Mn/Hrr&E), and Pr(Mn/Ha&E). Also, 
Pr(Mn/Ha&E) is less than Pr(Mn/Hct&E), Pr(Mn/Hnt&E), and 
Pr(Mn/H &E). It is also clear that the MO to M9 options are mutually exclu-
sive and ;rxhaustive so that the liklihoods relative to each hypothesis should 
sum to 1. Thus Pr(MO/H t&E) + Pr(M1/Hct&E) + ... + Pr(M9/Hct&E) = 1 
and Pr(MO/Hnt&E) + Pr(~I/Hnt&E) + ... + Pr(M9/H t&E) = 1, etc. Let us 
assign values to some of the liklihoods in a manner whi~ heavily weights the 
90+% range giving a higher probability to Pr(M9/Hct&E) than to 
Pr(M5/Hct&E). For example, let Pr(M5/Hct&E) = .04, Pr(M6/ Hct&E) = .06, 
Pr(M7/I:Ict&E) = .10, Pr(MS/Hct&E) = .15, and Pr(M9/Hct&E) = .25. Let 
also Pr(M5/Ha&E) = .02, Pr(M6/Ha&E) = .015, Pr(M7/Ha&E) = .012, 
Pr(MS/Ha&E) = .OOS, and Pr(M9/H &E) = .005. Several additional probabil-
ities must be assigned in order to cafculate posterior probabilities for M5 and 
M9. Let Pr(M5/Hnt&E) and Pr(M5/H &E) = .03 and let Pr(M9/H t&E) = 
.025 and Pr(M9/H &E) = .02. Using prior probabilities of .25 for me four 
hypotheses, we can~lOw compute posterior probabilities for M5 and M9. The 
posterior probabilities for M5 are: Pr(Hct/M5&E) = .33, Pr(Hnt/M5&E) = .25, 
Pr(Hp/M&E) = .25, and Pr(Ha/M&E) = .17. The posterior probabilities for 
M9 ate: PrCH t/M9&E) = .S33, Pr(Hnt/M9&E) = .OS3, Pr(H /M9&E) = .067, 
and Pr(Ha/i:r9&E) = .017. This shows M5 does provide support for Hct' The 
posterior probability shows a 33% increase from the prior probability. Of 
course, M9 does, as would be expected, provide stronger confirmation for Bet 
than does MS. Although many non-theists like Nietzsche might believe that 
God has a duty to provide them with all the evidence that they want, it is pos-
sible that a being vastly superior to us, while having a moral duty to provide 
substantial evidence, might have an agenda and motivations which do not 
give providing human beings with uncontestable evidence of his existence, 
the priority we might hope or expect. Because we cannot definitively predict 
the behavior of a supreme being who is far above us in knowledge, we should 
not overweight the probabilities for the 90+% range. If we assign .5 to the lik-
lihood pr(M/Hcr&E), then a more balanced and equal allocation of this prob-
ability to the iiI< ihoods Pr(M5/Hct&E) through Pr(M9/Hct&E) would seem 
more reasonable. 
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